The Enclave Issue Between Armenia and Azerbaijan

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The issue of Armenian and Azerbaijani enclaves has re-emerged in the public discourse during Armenia’s election campaign. On May 16, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was asked about the matter during a campaign event. His multilayered and ambiguous response sparked competing interpretations across Armenia’s deeply polarized political environment.

Responding to the question concerning Azerbaijani enclaves inside Armenia, Pashinyan stated that “solutions” would be found through the ongoing border delimitation process with Azerbaijan. His remarks fueled renewed debate over whether the delimitation process could eventually involve the restoration or formal recognition of former Soviet-era enclaves. 

In 2025, both Armenia and Azerbaijan indicated that the enclave issue would be addressed within the broader delimitation and demarcation process, linking it to the ongoing peace negotiations. In November 2025, Pashinyan wrote on his official Facebook page that “as a result of the delimitation, we must regain Artsvashen and the other occupied sovereign territories of the Republic of Armenia.” 

This article examines the historical origins and evolution of the enclaves issue, its legal and political dimensions, relevant international parallels, and possible options being considered by both sides for resolution within the broader Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process.

Formation, Evolution and Legal Framework of Armenian–Azerbaijani Enclaves

The enclave issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a legacy of Soviet administrative border-making in the 1920s, when borders within the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR) were drawn to reflect political and ethnic considerations rather than geographic logic. The Kavburo (Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party) sought to balance representation among nationalities by assigning settlements to republics based on ethnic composition, even when doing so created isolated territorial pockets.

Early Soviet maps, including those produced by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs in the 1920s, did not depict Azerbaijani enclaves within Armenia, suggesting that these entities emerged later through administrative adjustments rather than through formal border treaties. The 1926 Soviet map does not show them inside Armenia, and Artsvashen appears as part of the Armenian SSR on maps through the 1970s, including the 1975 General Staff map now used in the current delimitation process.

However, enclave villages feature on the maps at the end of the Soviet period: Combined, the Azerbaijani enclaves inside Armenia have covered about 45 square kilometers, while Artsvashen’s area is about 40-42 square kilometers — slightly smaller but historically more densely populated. 

Artsvashen: From Contiguous Armenian Territory to an Enclave

Artsvashen was historically connected to Soviet Armenia through a narrow peninsular land corridor. During the Soviet border adjustments of the 1920s, the territorial status of the area was repeatedly revised by the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee. Although the dispute over Artsvashen was formally settled in favor of the Armenian SSR between 1923 and 1929, in January 1927 approximately 12,000 hectares of surrounding land were transferred to the Azerbaijani SSR, gradually isolating the territory. Armenia briefly regained a narrow strip of land in 1929 to preserve direct access to Artsvashen, but this decision was later reversed in the 1930s, transforming Artsvashen into an Armenian exclave within Azerbaijan. 

Despite its separation, Artsvashen functioned normally during the Soviet period, as internal administrative borders within the USSR did not restrict movement between the Armenian and Azerbaijani republics.

Azerbaijani Enclaves in Armenia: Administrative Constructs

The Azerbaijani enclaves within Armenia were primarily administrative constructs. To preserve ethnic representation, Soviet authorities attached Azerbaijani-inhabited villages inside Armenia to the Azerbaijani SSR or to Nakhichevan. This was reinforced by internal resettlement of Azerbaijanis to those villages in Soviet Armenia during the early Soviet decades. These enclaves, Karki (Tigranashen), Yukhari Askipara (Verin Voskepar), and Barkhudarli and Sofulu, which together formed one enclave, thus became fragmented ethno-political entities rather than organically developed territories.

Throughout the Soviet period, these enclaves created administrative and governance complications, although their political and security significance remained limited as long as republican borders functioned primarily as internal administrative boundaries within the USSR.

Rising Insecurity During the Late Soviet Period

Long before the outbreak of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict in 1988, Armenian villages located near the Azerbaijani enclaves inside Soviet Armenia were already experiencing growing insecurity. Disputes over land use, grazing rights, and administrative control periodically escalated into intimidation and violence by neighboring Azerbaijani communities from the enclaves, reflecting rising inter-ethnic polarization and the gradual erosion of Soviet central authority.

From 1987–1988, these incidents intensified, and by the onset of the Karabakh Movement they had already created an atmosphere of fear and hostility. Amnesty International traced the beginnings of systematic abductions of Armenian civilians to this period, while Human Rights Watch described “hostage-taking … frightening people in neighboring villages.” 

In May 1991, Operation Koltso (Ring) jointly conducted by the Soviet and Azerbaijani Interior-Ministry forces, targeted Armenian-populated communities in Noyemberyan, Ijevan, and Shamshadin (Tavush) and Artsvashen, with documented civilian casualties and deportations. 

By the final years of the Soviet Union, the enclave areas had thus evolved from administrative irregularities into zones of recurring intercommunal tension, reflecting the sharp deterioration of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations and the collapse of effective Soviet control.

Reconfiguration of Control During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War

During the 1991–1994 war, the enclave areas were gradually drawn into broader hostilities and came under the control of the opposing sides. Karki (Tigranashen) came under Armenian control in 1990 during clashes in Nakhichevan, while Yukhari Askipara, Barkhudarli, and Sofulu were taken under Armenian control in 1992 amid fighting in Tavush.

In August 1992, Artsvashen was captured by Azerbaijani forces, leading to the displacement of its Armenian population, estimated at between 2,730 and 4,500 inhabitants. The settlement was subsequently repopulated by approximately 3,000 Azerbaijanis.

Since the 1994 ceasefire, each enclave has remained under the control of the surrounding state, establishing a de facto status quo that persists in the absence of a formal settlement.

Legal Foundations and Contemporary Frameworks

The 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration signed by all former Soviet republics, remains the principal legal basis for post-Soviet borders. It affirmed that the newly independent states would recognize one another’s borders as corresponding to the administrative boundaries of the former Soviet republics at the moment of the dissolution of the USSR (Commonwealth of Independent States). However, because many Soviet internal borders had never been fully demarcated or legally ratified, interpretations diverged after independence. 

Artsvashen’s status as Armenian territory is documented in Soviet-era maps and archival materials, including records related to territorial adjustments and the gradual isolation of the settlement from the Armenian SSR.

At the same time, Armenian officials and experts have repeatedly questioned whether formal Soviet legal documentation exists demonstrating the transfer of Azerbaijani enclave territories to the Azerbaijani SSR. Pashinyan stated in 2022 that “according to our research, the existence of Azerbaijani enclaves on the territory of Armenia has not yet been de jure recorded. On the contrary, we have recorded that Artsvashen is de jure the territory of Armenia.”

Until 2025, Armenia has argued that the delimitation process should rely on documentary verification and the 1975 Soviet General Staff maps, which most accurately reflect the borders existing at the time of the USSR’s collapse. Azerbaijan, by contrast, has maintained that the administrative boundaries existing in 1991 already constitute the legal interstate border and should be accepted without further reinterpretation. Azerbaijani authorities and experts frequently raised the enclave issue prior to 2025, but since then the issue appears to have become notably less visible in official rhetoric and public discourse. Prior to the launch of the delimitation process, there were widespread concerns that Azerbaijan might attempt to seize the enclaves through military force. However, from mid-2024 onward, the issue became part of the formal negotiation agenda. At the same time, public concerns in Armenia gradually shifted toward the possibility that the enclaves could eventually be ceded through the negotiation process, whether voluntarily, under diplomatic pressure, or as part of broader concessions within the peace process.

The Alma-Ata principle was reaffirmed in the 2022 Prague Statement and the 2025 Washington Declaration, where Armenia and Azerbaijan reconfirmed mutual recognition of territorial integrity and commitment to delimitation based on the 1991 borders.

Launching the Delimitation and Demarcation Process in 2024

After three decades of ambiguity, the official border delimitation and demarcation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan formally began in 2024, marking the first formal bilateral effort to define the interstate border since the 1994 ceasefire. The process is conducted through joint delimitation commissions and relies primarily on Soviet General Staff maps from 1975 at a scale of 1:100,000, which Armenian officials and several analysts consider the most accurate representation of the administrative borders existing at the time of the dissolution of the USSR. 

Following the launch of the delimitation process and the first practical delimitation steps in Tavush in April 2024, the process was further formalized through the “Regulation on Joint Activity of the Commissions on Delimitation of the State Border and Border Security” between the two countries, signed on August 30, 2024. The Regulation established the legal and procedural framework for the delimitation process and entered into force on November 1, 2024 following the completion of domestic approval procedures in both countries. It has been described as the first bilateral legal agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the beginning of the conflict and the restoration of their independence.

The first and so far, the only practical outcome of the process occurred in May 2024, when Armenia returned four Azerbaijani exclave villages that were under Armenian control since the first Karabakh war: Baghanis Ayrim (Baghanis Ayrum), Ashaghi Askipara/Nerkin Voskepar (Nerkin Voskebar), Kheyrimli, and Gizilhajili. Armenian authorities presented the move as the first stage of delimitation, a goodwill gesture, and a step toward a rules-based peace process grounded in the Alma-Ata framework. Azerbaijani forces also withdrew from some areas and several positions and they came under Armenian control following delimitation, although these were considerably fewer than the areas and positions from which Armenian forces withdrew. Subsequently, military servicemen of both sides have been replaced by unarmed border service troops on both sides of the delimited section. 

Amid growing public dissatisfaction and criticism over the territorial concessions, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan acknowledged in March that the decision was also intended to prevent a possible Azerbaijani military escalation, warning that Armenia could face war if the issue was not resolved. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev portrayed the outcome as the result of Azerbaijan’s coercive leverage, emphasizing that the villages had been returned “without a single shot being fired.” 

The decision triggered significant domestic controversy in Armenia. A protest movement called “Tavush for the Homeland,” led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, emerged in opposition to the process and rapidly expanded from Tavush to Yerevan. The movement accused the government of surrendering Armenian territory and argued that the delimitation process was unilateral, unconstitutional, and harmful to Armenia’s security. 

More moderate critics also viewed the process as asymmetrical for three principal reasons. First, Azerbaijani forces continue to occupy several Armenian border areas, reportedly amounting to approximately 241 square kilometres across the Syunik, Vayots Dzor and Gegharkunik regions following the incursions of 2021–2022. Armenian authorities have repeatedly stated that the return of these territories should be resolved exclusively through the delimitation and demarcation process. Second, Azerbaijan continued to employ military coercion and threats in the negotiation process. Third, the transfer of the villages was perceived as weakening the security environment of neighboring Armenian communities in Tavush. 

Supporters of the process, by contrast, argued that the return of the villages represented a necessary step toward stabilizing the border and advancing the peace process in accordance with the Alma-Ata Declaration and the Prague Statement. The Tavush movement was widely perceived by pro-government circles and analysts as being guided or at least instrumentalized by pro-Russian political forces seeking to derail the peace process, provoke renewed conflict with Azerbaijan that could result in further territorial losses for Armenia, trigger an unconstitutional change of power, and ultimately restore Armenia’s dependence on Russia through Moscow’s renewed role as Armenia’s “savior” and security guarantor. 

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan repeatedly referred to the village of Kirants as evidence that delimitation could contribute to a more stable border environment. Armenian authorities also point to the construction of new infrastructure and alternative roads, while in Kirants a fence was built along the newly delimited border. A new school was built in the village, while the local church was restored, becoming symbols of the government’s effort to normalize life in the border area after delimitation. By 2025–2026, public understanding in Armenia of the logic and practical implications of the delimitation process appears to have increased. 

Current Status and Challenges of the Delimitation Process

Despite these developments, progress in delimitation has remained limited. As of 2026, the approximately 12-kilometer section delimited and demarcated in the Tavush region in 2024 remained the only segment of the 996-kilometer long Armenia–Azerbaijan border where the process had been formally implemented.

While Azerbaijani forces continue to control approximately 241 square kilometers of Armenian territory following the incursions of 2021–2022, Armenian officials have recently acknowledged that Armenia also retains control over several areas that belonged de jure to the former Azerbaijani SSR. According to cartographic assessments, however, those territories are significantly smaller, estimated at roughly 15–21 square kilometers.

This asymmetry has contributed to public anxiety in Armenia regarding the delimitation process. Concerns persist that Azerbaijan may seek the return of enclaves and other disputed territories while indefinitely delaying or avoiding the withdrawal of its forces from Armenian territories occupied since 2021–2022. These concerns have been reinforced by Azerbaijani official rhetoric that continues to describe parts of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border as “conditional.” 

The low level of trust between the parties, combined with Azerbaijan’s use of military pressure and coercive rhetoric, has further rooted scepticism within Armenian society regarding the reciprocity and long-term sustainability of the process. While overt military pressure has decreased following the Washington agreement of 2025, confrontational rhetoric, narrative warfare, and indirect preconditions for the finalization of the peace process continue to be voiced by Aliyev or through government-sponsored circles in Azerbaijan. Concerns persist within Armenian society that the process may either stall indefinitely or proceed asymmetrically, enabling Azerbaijan to retain occupied Armenian territories while simultaneously advancing claims regarding enclaves and other disputed border areas.

The delimitation commissions have continued to meet periodically, including in May 2026, although public information regarding future timelines and sequencing has remained limited. Armenian officials initially stated that the process would proceed gradually from north to south. However, following the Washington summit, increasing attention shifted toward sections connected to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity initiative.

Following the May 2026 meeting of the commissions, Armenian authorities published three draft methodological documents concerning the delimitation process. The documents regulate procedures related to cartographic and geodetic work, the preparation and verification of maps and coordinates, as well as the formalization, documentation, and publication of delimitation outcomes. Their publication reflected an effort to institutionalize and standardize the technical and procedural framework of the delimitation process.

Comparative Experiences of Enclave Stability and Instability

The following cases are not presented as directly transferable models for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rather, they illustrate how enclave arrangements function under different political, security and institutional conditions, highlighting the factors that can either mitigate or intensify instability surrounding fragmented territorial configurations.

Baarle-Hertog/Baarle-Nassau (Belgium–Netherlands)

The most complex network of enclaves in Europe — 22 Belgian enclaves inside the Netherlands and seven Dutch counter-enclaves — was stabilized not through border changes but through European integration and the removal of barriers under the Schengen framework. Administrative cooperation, integrated infrastructure, and shared municipal services reduced the practical significance of the border, transforming the Baarle enclaves into a widely cited example of functional coexistence.

The stability of the Baarle-Hertog/Baarle-Nassau enclaves rests on the deep institutional integration of Belgium and the Netherlands within the European Union, the Schengen Area, and the Benelux framework. With no physical border controls, residents move freely, while local governance operates through shared services and overlapping municipal arrangements. Linguistic and cultural commonalities between the Flemish-speaking Belgian and Dutch populations further reduce potential sources of tension. The Baarle case demonstrates that enclave arrangements become manageable primarily where borders have lost much of their political, security, and symbolic significance through deep institutional integration, open borders, and mutual trust. Such conditions are absent in the Armenia–Azerbaijan context, and would be more likely to generate new tensions and instability than contribute to conflict resolution.

Llívia (Spain–France)

Llívia is a small Spanish town located within the French Pyrenees, approximately two kilometers from the nearest point of Spain. Its status originates from the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees, which transferred several Catalan villages from Spain to France but exempted Llívia because it was legally classified as a town rather than a village. The enclave’s stability was later reinforced through the Treaty of Bayonne of 1866, which guaranteed an access corridor connecting it to Spain.

European integration, the Schengen framework, and cross-border cooperation have since reduced the practical significance of the border. Residents participate freely in cross-border economic and social life through coordinated local governance and integrated infrastructure. The case of Llívia demonstrates that enclaves can remain stable primarily when embedded within a framework of legal certainty, mutual trust, and regional integration, conditions absent between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Middle Eastern Example: Madha and Nahwa

The Madha–Nahwa double enclave between Oman and the United Arab Emirates represents a rare example of peaceful enclave coexistence. Madha, an Omani territory entirely surrounded by the UAE, in turn contains the smaller Emirati enclave of Nahwa. Their stability rests on unrestricted movement, close coordination between local authorities, and the absence of meaningful border controls on the ground.

The arrangement functions largely because the two states maintain close political relations, cultural and tribal continuity, and a tradition of resolving territorial issues through consensus rather than confrontation. As a result, sovereignty remains formally intact while daily economic and social life proceeds with minimal friction across enclave boundaries. The Madha and Nahwa case illustrates that enclave stability depends less on geography than on sustained political trust and cooperative regional frameworks.

Cyprus: Cypriot Turkish Enclaves Before 1974

A relevant comparison can be drawn from Cyprus, where Turkish Cypriot enclaves emerged following the intercommunal violence of 1963–1964. As tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities escalated, many Turkish Cypriots withdrew into geographically fragmented enclave areas scattered across the island. These enclaves became increasingly isolated, economically constrained, and heavily securitized, relying on protected access routes, external assistance, and later military protection from Turkey.

The Cyprus case demonstrates how enclave-type territorial fragmentation in conditions of ethnic polarization, insecurity, and mutual distrust can deepen instability rather than facilitate coexistence. Disputes over access, mobility, security, and administration became persistent sources of tension, while the enclave system itself contributed to the broader militarization of the conflict. Rather than producing a sustainable framework for coexistence, the fragmented territorial arrangements became part of a larger escalation dynamic that ultimately culminated in the partition of the island in 1974.

The Cyprus experience illustrates that enclave arrangements in unresolved conflict environments tend to become highly securitized and dependent on broader political and security guarantees. In the absence of reconciliation, institutional cooperation, and mutual trust, fragmented territorial configurations may reinforce long-term instability instead of reducing conflict.

Central Asian Enclaves

The Vorukh (Tajikistan) and Sokh (Uzbekistan) enclaves inside Kyrgyzstan illustrate how unresolved enclave arrangements can become chronic sources of instability in non-integrated regions. Created through Soviet-era administrative decisions that often ignored local geography and intercommunal dynamics, these enclaves left densely populated communities dependent on transit routes crossing another state’s territory.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enclaves have experienced repeated border clashes, road blockades, and armed incidents linked to disputes over water, land, and access rights. Major escalations in 2013, 2021, and 2022 resulted in civilian casualties and mass evacuations, highlighting the fragility of borders lacking clear demarcation and effective conflict-management mechanisms. 

The Central Asian experience demonstrates that, in the absence of regional integration, reliable access arrangements, and mutual trust, enclaves are more likely to perpetuate recurring confrontation than stable coexistence.

Comparative Lessons from International Enclave Cases

Several broader lessons emerge from international experiences with enclaves and exclaves. 

• First, enclaves tend to remain structurally fragile even under relatively cooperative conditions, as they concentrate questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, movement and security within narrow and often contested geographic spaces.
• Second, the European examples of Baarle and Llívia demonstrate that enclave-related tensions can be substantially reduced when embedded within broader frameworks of regional integration. Open borders, shared governance mechanisms, integrated infrastructure, and mutual political trust have largely transformed these enclaves from potential points of dispute into functional cross-border communities. Such conditions, however, are fundamentally absent between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where borders continue to carry strong security, geopolitical and symbolic significance.
• Third, international experience suggests that legal clarity, predictable transit arrangements, and mutual confidence are essential prerequisites for enclave stability. In their absence, enclaves are more likely to become recurring sources of confrontation, as illustrated by the repeated tensions and violence surrounding the Central Asian enclaves of Vorukh and Sokh.
• Finally, enclave stability depends on the broader quality of intersocietal relations. In most European enclave cases, coexistence has been facilitated not only by institutional integration but also by relatively high levels of social interaction, cultural proximity and political reconciliation. By contrast, relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis remain deeply affected by decades of violent conflict, forced displacement, mutual distrust, and competing historical narratives. Under such conditions, the restoration of enclaves would risk reproducing insecurity and tension rather than promoting coexistence and regional connectivity.

Policy Options, Scenarios, and Implications for Armenia–Azerbaijan Enclaves

Within the broader delimitation and demarcation process, several possible scenarios for the resolution of the enclave issue appear to be under consideration, although discussions remain ambiguous and no detailed framework has been publicly articulated by either side.

a) Re-creation of Enclaves Based on Soviet Administrative Borders

The re-creation of the enclaves on the basis of Soviet-era administrative borders represents one possible scenario. This approach aligns with the principle of uti possidetis juris, according to which newly independent states inherit the administrative boundaries existing at the time of independence, and with the logic of the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration.

However, this option would create significant challenges. During the Soviet period, movement between the Armenian and Azerbaijani republics did not require passports, visas, or border controls, since both formed part of the same state. Residents of border and enclave areas moved relatively freely for trade, agriculture, grazing, and social interaction, although such contacts also periodically generated localized tensions.

Following the dissolution of the USSR, these administrative boundaries became international borders between two states that experienced more than three decades of conflict, still have no diplomatic relations, and remain engaged in a fragile and unfinished peace process marked by mistrust and highly restricted cross-border movement.

Under such conditions, the re-creation of enclaves would raise complex questions regarding access, transit rights, jurisdiction, border administration, as well as infrastructure connectivity, including roads, utilities, pipelines, and telecommunications. Roads linking enclaves to the mainland would require checkpoints, customs facilities, and permanent coordination mechanisms, increasing the political and logistical sensitivity of such territories. The re-creation of enclaves could generate recurring disputes over movement and access, creating political sensitivities, new sources of tension and insecurity rather than contributing to sustainable peace.

b) Connectivity Arrangements for Former Enclaves

Connectivity arrangements for former enclaves represent another possible scenario under discussion. This approach would seek to transform former enclaves into connected territories through the establishment of access routes and the reconstruction of local infrastructure to ensure uninterrupted connectivity and prevent isolation. Such arrangements could include roads, utilities, and other transit mechanisms linking enclave territories to the mainland while preserving formally recognized sovereignty. Under Armenia’s Constitution, however, such arrangements would also require approval through a national referendum if they involve changes affecting the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

At the same time, this would likely be a technically and politically complex option to implement. It would require legal arrangements concerning jurisdiction and property rights, infrastructure reconstruction, management of public perceptions, synchronized implementation and sustained political coordination between the parties. It would depend on a level of mutual trust and institutional cooperation that remains limited under current conditions. This option could generate new disputes and operational frictions rather than lasting stability.

c) Selective Resolution Based on Documented Legal Status

Another possible scenario would involve differentiating between Artsvashen and the former Azerbaijani enclaves on the basis of their documented legal and administrative status. Under this approach, Artsvashen could theoretically be returned to Armenia, given that its belonging to the Armenian SSR is documented in Soviet-era legal and archival materials, while the legal-administrative basis for the Azerbaijani enclaves inside Armenia remains unclear publicly.

At the same time, this option would likely be politically sensitive and difficult to implement. Azerbaijan is unlikely to accept an arrangement perceived as asymmetrical, particularly given its broader negotiating approach based on sustained pressure and maximalist positions. Under current conditions of limited trust and unresolved security tensions, such an approach could become a source of renewed political tensions and instability rather than facilitate a mutually acceptable settlement.

d) Maintain and Formalize the Status Quo Through Delimitation

The existing lines of control in relation to the enclaves could be affirmed as the interstate boundary. This approach would reduce legal ambiguity, minimize immediate friction, and avoid the creation of new isolated territorial pockets. Conceptually, it corresponds to the principle of unitas territorii—the unity and indivisibility of a state’s territory—preserving territorial cohesion and continuity while preventing the re-emergence of fragmented enclaves.

In practical terms, this option would also amount to a de facto territorial exchange: Armenia would retain control over the former Azerbaijani enclave territories currently under its control, while Azerbaijan would retain control over Artsvashen. Because the enclave territories are broadly comparable in geographic size, some observers view this as the simplest and most pragmatic solution, potentially allowing both sides to consolidate continuous borders while avoiding the complex access, transit, and security issues associated with enclave restoration.

However, according to Prime Minister Pashinyan, such an arrangement could require a national referendum under Article 205 of the country’s Constitution, which stipulates that changes to the territory of the Republic of Armenia are subject to approval through referendum.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the enclave issue cannot be addressed in isolation from the broader Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process and the wider regional security environment. International experience demonstrates that enclaves remain stable primarily where broader political reconciliation, mutual trust, legal clarity, institutional cooperation, and regional integration already exist. In the context of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations, where the peace process remains fragile and incomplete, any sustainable resolution will require not only technical delimitation agreements but also gradual normalization, reciprocal guarantees, confidence-building, and a broader commitment to transforming borders from lines of confrontation into mechanisms of coexistence and connectivity.

Finally, the enclave issue cannot be separated from the broader context of unresolved security tensions, including the recent history of military pressure, coercive diplomacy, the non-finalized peace agreement, and the continued presence of Azerbaijani forces in Armenian border areas following the 2021-2022 incursions. For this reason, sequencing remains essential: the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from Armenian sovereign territory would likely need to precede, or at least accompany on a reciprocal basis, the resolution of enclave-related issues. Otherwise, attempts to restore, reconnect, or exchange enclave territories could risk reinforcing asymmetry and mistrust rather than contributing to a stable, balanced, and durable peace settlement.

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