Party Positions: Foreign Policy and Security

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The parliamentary elections of June 7 are perhaps the first since independence where foreign policy is central to the discourse. With Armenia’s geopolitical orientation more contested than ever, parties and prime ministerial candidates are expected to clearly articulate their position on the country’s strategic direction, security, relations with neighbors, TRIPP and broader regional dynamics. The result is a growing divide between those advocating deeper alignment with the West and those calling for the restoration of closer ties with Russia.

At the time of publication, only seven parties or alliances have published their platforms on the website of the Central Electoral Commission. In addition to their platforms (if available), their positions are drawn from leaders’ speeches, interviews, and social media posts.

Civil Contract (Nikol Pashinyan)

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract, Armenia’s ruling party since 2018, has increasingly aligned Armenia with the West in recent years, while declaring a “balanced and balancing foreign policy” since 2024. This approach reflects Pashinyan’s strategy of diversifying away from dependence on Russia, especially in security matters, following what Yerevan viewed as Moscow’s inaction during and after the September 2022 Azerbaijani incursion into Armenian territory. 

Pashinyan has advanced the idea of independence as “replacing dependence on few with dependence on many,” arguing that even diversified partnerships must remain balanced to avoid new forms of overreliance. Within this context, his government has prioritized building strategic partnerships with a growing list of Western and non-Western states rather than pursuing formal alliances.

A key aspect of Pashinyan’s foreign policy is deeper EU integration. He told the European Parliament in October 2023 that Armenia “is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the EU considers it possible.” Pashinyan’s cabinet endorsed and parliament passed a symbolic law in parliament in March 2025 which “announces the launch of the process for Armenia to join the EU.” Pashinyan has framed aligning Armenia with EU standards as a win-win: if accepted, Armenia joins the EU; if not, it will still become a modernized state as it will have to carry out thorough reforms to meet the rigorous benchmarks of the accession process. In the meantime, Yerevan has no plans to exit the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for as long as membership in both remains compatible, deferring the choice to the future.

Meanwhile, Pashinyan has sought to maintain a measured approach toward Russia. In a February interview, he formulated his government’s “strategic vision” regarding relations with Russia as follows: “Harming Russia, harming Russia’s interests, has not been, is not, and will not be on our agenda.” He also spoke of his “very direct and warm relationship” with President Putin, adding: “This is our strategy։ we will not act against Russia, but we will always act in the interest of the Republic of Armenia.” Pashinyan has likewise stated that Yerevan has no plans to request the closure of the Russian military base in Gyumri.

The party’s election platform, released in early April, provided further details. It stresses the importance of regional integration aimed at enabling Armenia to live securely and sustainably within its own region without relying excessively on external support and in this context, further developing relations with Georgia, Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan. While the party states that it will “develop mutually beneficial and constructive relations” with Moscow, “no steps will be taken to return” to the CSTO, where membership is frozen.

Pashinyan has framed TRIPP as a way out of a 34-year blockade (by Azerbaijan and Turkey) and defended the peace treaty with Azerbaijan (and the Washington Accords of August 8, 2025) against any “revision” (renegotiation) as inevitably leading to war. During his February visit to Yerevan, U.S. Vice President JD Vance endorsed Pashinyan. “I know he has an election coming up, I won’t talk about that, but to the extent my endorsement means anything, he certainly has it,” he said.

The party’s platform lists several “tools” for ensuring Armenia’s external security. It identifies international legitimacy, specifically, having undisputed territory and legitimate positions is named as “the foremost tool of external security.” Next, interconnectedness with the outside world and long-term predictability are identified as key pillars of security. The military, meanwhile, is described as “the instrument of last resort,” to be used when diplomatic measures have failed. The platform argues that Armenia has invested “enormous efforts and resources” into strengthening its defense capabilities, expanding the defense-industrial complex, and carrying out large-scale, innovative fortification works along the border.

Strong Armenia (Samvel & Narek Karapetyan)

The party program of Strong Armenia declares an “Armenia-centered [foreign] policy”, along with advancing “historically established ties and relationships, and building effective cooperation with new partners.”

As a Russia-based billionaire, Samvel Karapetyan is understood to have cooperative relations with the Kremlin. During a recent meeting with Pashinyan, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke of Karapetyan—without naming him—as a “pro-Russian” politician. Putin said he “would very much like to see” all these parties and politicians run the June election, but “some are currently in custody, despite holding Russian passports,” in a clear reference to Karapetyan who is under house arrest.

In January 2025, before his arrival in Armenia and entry into politics, Samvel Karapetyan had expressed deep concern regarding the possibility of the country exiting the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Armenia’s membership in the organization is “critically important”, he said, adding that it not only contributes to economic growth but also provides an important level of security. As he entered politics after his arrest in June 2025, Karapetyan accused Pashinyan of having “completely dismantled the country’s external security, utterly destroyed relations with the main ally” Russia. Karapetyan has warned of an “economic war” with Russia if Pashinyan is re-elected, adding that by voting for him, Armenians “will get poverty and enmity with the Russians, polarization, and economic collapse.”

Narek Karapetyan, Samvel’s nephew and number one on their list as the latter is ineligible for the premiership, has provided more details in interviews. Pressed on his uncle’s ties to Russia and his ability to “operate independently while holding significant capital in Russia,” Narek Karapetyan has assured that “Armenia is Samvel Karapetyan’s homeland, and Armenia’s interests are his top priority” and that the opportunities they have across the globe “will serve Armenia’s interests” and the connections they hold “will be used to increase the prosperity of every single Armenian citizen.”

The party platform declares that sustainable peace with Azerbaijan “must be ensured through the involvement of more than one guarantor.” It supports full normalization of relations with Turkey without preconditions, but “excluding the surrender of historical truth and national dignity.” It will seek a “multi-vector” foreign policy, including continued membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, strategic cooperation with Russia, deeper ties with the EU and the United States, and “an open and proactive policy” toward others. It calls for continued membership in the CSTO, “ensuring the full use of the existing toolkit and the complete realization of potential.”

On hard security matters, Strong Armenia says it will develop strategic and asymmetric deterrence capabilities and turn Armenia into a “fortress-state”.

On the CSTO, Narek Karapetyan admitted that following the September 2022 Azerbaijani incursion, Armenian public trust in the military alliance has been undermined, but argued that a stronger Armenian leader should formally present the country’s concerns to partners and demand that the organization demonstrate its effectiveness. The burden is on CSTO partners themselves as they must prove, through negotiations and diplomatic pressure, that occupation of a member state’s territory is unacceptable, he said. Only then will Armenian society accept the CSTO as a credible long-term alliance.

In a January interview on Public TV, Narek Karapetyan explained their views on TRIPP and the peace treaty with Azerbaijan. He stressed that they would not seek to start from scratch, instead would strive to improve TRIPP, arguing that the inclusion of President Trump’s name should not create a false impression that the U.S. is a guarantor of peace. Washington is a witness, but Armenia needs multiple guarantors, Karapetyan suggested. While welcoming American engagement in Armenia’s security issues, he reiterated that Yerevan must seek several regional and global powers to be guarantors in both TRIPP and the peace treaty in order to turn the country into a “true crossroads of peace.”

Regarding Turkey, Karapetyan has warned against opening the border before Armenia creates conditions that would allow local farmers to compete with cheaper Turkish imports. At the same time, he has said his team supports the long-term normalization of relations, arguing that there is no fundamental conflict with Turkey, while noting that Ankara is currently focused primarily on deepening its cooperation with Azerbaijan.

Strong Armenia’s security program was presented in March by Artur Avanesyan (known by the moniker “Kandaz”), an intelligence officer and war veteran. It contains six principles: 1) equip the border with AI-based sensor automated systems to reduce the human factor; 2) establish an intelligence system for early detection of threats; 3) integrated command and control across all domains (land, air, information); 4) setting up a military-industrial complex to reduce dependence on other countries; 5) controlling the skies through air defense systems, electronic warfare, and counter-drone capabilities; 6) restore the honor of the Armenian soldier in society and raise the attractiveness of military service.

Karapetyan’s team has also boasted prospective international cooperation. It had engaged former Israeli Air Defense Forces Commander Zvika Haimovich as an adviser and signed MOUs with Dutch and Greek security companies.

Armenia Alliance (Robert Kocharyan)

Like Karapetyan, Armenia’s second President Robert Kocharyan is seen as aligned with Russia. An April 2025 report by the Russian newspaper Vedomosti identified Kocharyan as a “pro-Russian politician” who can “speak for Russia.”

Kocharyan and his allies have entertained the possibility of Armenia joining the Union State of Russia and Belarus. In October 2021, he refused to unequivocally state whether Armenia’s independence was non-negotiable or whether he supported the idea of a Union State. “Right now I’m not prepared to give a straightforward answer. What’s needed is an analysis of the threats facing our statehood. From a security standpoint, I get the impression that perhaps a broader format is needed,” he suggested.

By February 2022, Kocharyan appeared more open to the idea, suggesting Armenia should not fear the prospect of a union state with Russia and describing it as one possible path toward making Armenia a more consequential regional actor. He argued that such questions should be approached pragmatically and through “concrete calculation,” while suggesting that Russia was the only power genuinely interested in making Armenia a relevant force in the region.

In a November 2025 interview, Agnesa Khamoyan, a senior ally of Kocharyan, argued that Union State is a “fake topic” since there is no formulated proposal for Armenia to join. She defended Kocharyan’s past remarks by stating that a statesman must consider all options that could benefit the country’s security. She also disputed the idea that the Union State uniquely represents a loss of sovereignty while the EU does not. If the Armenia Alliance comes to power and a proposal is made, she suggested that the option will be seriously discussed.

In recent months, Kocharyan has repeatedly criticized TRIPP. In his October 2025 interview, he framed it as a corridor with zero benefits for Armenia. It would benefit Armenia, he argued, only if it secures railway links to Iran and Russia. Otherwise, he said, the entire project is both “pointless and dangerous.” He stressed that Iran is not happy about it and warned of an Iranian reaction to American presence along its border. 

Kocharyan also claimed that peace today is “a ceasefire dependent on the whims” of Aliyev, because there are no guarantors. He offered a peace with verification mechanisms and guarantors. Kocharyan suggested that the United States, merely a witness, has no “vital interests” in the South Caucasus and that Washington will not “intervene in anything” since “they’ve already gotten what they need.” In a January press conference, Kocharyan called TRIPP Armenia’s biggest security threat.

Kocharyan had spoken about “balanced relations” with Europe, Russia, and China with the Armenia Alliance calling for Armenia’s membership in BRICS, which it describes as “the world’s greatest economic and geopolitical organization.” 

Kocharyan has warned about the consequences of “openly ruining our relations with Russia.” He added that while Russia is a “very patient” country, there’s a line that they “won’t forgive you for crossing” and he will aim not to worsen ties with “powerful countries” and “not get caught in the middle of their conflicts.” He has also warned against putting Armenia’s membership in the EAEU at risk.

Prosperous Armenia (Gagik Tsarukyan)

Tsarukyan has called for “restoring strategic and predictable balance” in foreign policy by building “partnership relations with all major international actors,” namely Russia, the United States, the European Union, China, India, as well as with neighboring countries. A year earlier, he warned against pursuing EU membership while risking ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). He has warned of severe economic consequences if Armenia exits the EAEU, with gas prices skyrocketing and hundreds of thousands of Armenians returning from Russia if relations sour.

Through his political career, Gagik Tsarukyan has maintained close personal relations with Belarusian President Lukashenko.[1] Recently pressed about it, Tsarukyan did not back down, reiterating that Lukashenko is his friend and he does not abandon his friends. He has also kept warm relations with the Kremlin, signing a cooperation agreement with the ruling United Russia party of President Putin in 2019.[2] During the 2021 election campaign, Tsarukyan declared that “Russia is our main ally, and that is not up for revision.”

Ara Ayvazyan, who briefly served as Foreign Minister following the 2020 war and has joined Tsarukyan’s list, addressed foreign policy and security in a recent party congress. Ayvazyan called for maintaining membership in the Russian-led organizations (EAEU, CSTO) while moving from “declaratory mechanisms to active, functional security systems.” He proposed talks with the United States to secure tangible guarantees, and cooperation with the European Union to achieve institutional and economic strengthening. Finally, he called for establishing a strict balance in the region where exerting pressure on Armenia becomes pointless.

Wings of Unity (Arman Tatoyan)

Former Human Rights Ombudsman Arman Tatoyan, who is the candidate from the newly formed Wings of Unity party, presented the party’s positions in a press conference in November 2025. He said he would conduct a pragmatic foreign policy that reduces total dependence on any single market or country, particularly Russia. He emphasizes that he is not “anti-Russian” but is “pro-Armenia” and called for “functional” relations with Russia while eliminating the “degree of dependence” that has existed for years. He views the United States as a “reliable partner” and seeks to adopt the best aspects of their educational, high-tech, and defense innovation systems.

In an op-ed in the Washington Times in late December 2025, Tatoyan wrote that the Washington Accords and TRIPP have “seem to have put off (maybe even scuttled) Baku’s plans to seize all of Syunik Province. In return, Baku will have access to a U.S.-run road through Armenian territory. That’s a decent solution, but it leaves the preexisting occupations in place.” He called on American and European mediators to state that Azerbaijani occupation of Armenian territory is “incompatible with any credible peace settlement” and negotiations “must be tied to compliance.”

The party has not opposed the EU efforts to counter Russian influence in the elections, but has called on Brussels to “equally” counter Azerbaijani interference. In a letter to the EU delegation in Yerevan, Tatoyan pointed to official and state-aligned Azerbaijani voices using “threats, coercive rhetoric, and coordinated informational pressure” to “intimidate the Armenian population and shape the political environment during a sensitive electoral period” by making “explicit or thinly veiled threats about the consequences of a change in government.” He urged the EU to publicly denounce these statements and attempts to influence Armenia’s electoral process and “counteract Azerbaijani interference efforts in a transparent and consistent manner.”

In April, the party released its platform providing campaign promises and positions that will “guarantee peaceful coexistence with our neighbors.” It vows to build a professional, high-tech army and to secure investment in the domestic defense industry.

The party states that Armenia will not abandon its international commitments: they will implement TRIPP, “reassess” membership in the EAEU, and deepen ties with the United States and European nations “in accordance with Armenia’s interests.” Protecting the rights of “our compatriots” in international courts, including securing reparations for violations of the rights of Armenians from Artsakh, will be a top priority. The party also vows to resume efforts to advance international recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

Wings of Unity states that, once in power, it will “liberate Armenia’s sovereign territories from Azerbaijani occupation” and advocate for the rights of POWs, missing persons, and families of fallen heroes. At last, it says it will advance on the international agenda the fundamental right of Artsakh Armenians to “a safe, dignified, and voluntary return.”

The party platform states that defense expenditure must not fall below 8% of GDP and promises to double funding for applied R&D in defense and security. It states that Wings of Unity “highly values the TRIPP initiative” and “will strive to improve that project” by “creating more favorable conditions for foreign trade.”

Republic Party (Aram Sargsyan)

Former Prime Minister Aram Sargsyan’s Republic (Hanrapetutyun) Party is staunchly pro-Western in its outlook. In 2023, the party formed a coalition in the Yerevan City Council with the ruling Civil Contract party, with which it is often aligned.

Sargsyan describes the upcoming elections as a geopolitical turning point for Armenia. 

He advocates for aligning Armenia with European standards and democratic values and strengthening Armenia’s sovereignty through deep cooperation with the “progressive world”.

He positions his party as the uncompromising pro-Western alternative to both the current government and the opposition. He has criticized Pashinyan’s “balancing” policy as “sitting on two chairs.” Sargsyan says he strives to accelerate Armenia’s pro-Western turn, namely EU accession and the implementation of strategic documents signed with the U.S. 

Rally for the Republic Party (Arman Babajanyan)

Former parliament member Arman Babajanyan, who launched the Rally For The Republic Party party in 2021, is similarly openly pro-Western.

Babajanyan, who also owns the 1in.am news outlet and online TV, joined forces in September 2024 with other like-minded partners to launch the Eurovote initiative, which successfully collected 50,000 signatures to propose a bill to parliament formally declaring the country’s intent to begin the process of joining the European Union. It partnered with Aram Sargsyan’s Republic Party and Tigran Khzmalyan’s European Party in the local elections in Gyumri in March 2025 under the name “Euro-alliance”.

The party welcomed the Washington Accords and TRIPP, noting that it can become “a powerful foundation for economic and security development.” It has also welcomed the Pashinyan government’s request and EU’s planned deployment of a team to help with countering foreign interference. The party is actively critical of Russia, calling for the removal of the 102nd base in Gyumri, shutting down Russian TV channels, protesting against visits of senior Russian officials such as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Senate Speaker Valentina Matviyenko.

New Force (Hayk Marutyan)

Former Yerevan Mayor and comedian Hayk Marutyan, a one-time ally of Pashinyan, launched the party New Force (Nor Uzh) in mid-2024. The party had welcomed the Washington Accords (including TRIPP) in August 2025. “It is important to recognize that, under the current circumstances, it would be difficult to envision a more favorable outcome than what was achieved through the involvement of our Western partners,” its statement read. The deal, it said, offers Armenia the opportunity—not guarantee—to avoid a new war and to pursue economic development. At the same time, Marutyan criticized Pashinyan’s foreign policy, which has brought “numerous disasters” upon Armenians.

The party program states that Armenia is “inseparably linked to European civilization.” It criticizes Pashinyan’s “short-sighted, uncalculated, and erratic foreign policy” that led to the fall of Artsakh and brought about security challenges.

The party calls for a balanced foreign policy, with strategic ties with Georgia and Iran and “dignified dialogue” with Turkey and Azerbaijan toward normalization and peaceful coexistence. The party wants deeper integration with the EU and European nations “across all possible directions and levels,” and maintaining “friendly relations” with Russia. It supports Armenia’s membership in the European Union “with a realistic scenario.” It strives for closer ties with the United States, India, China, and Middle Eastern countries. It also stresses the “indisputable right” of the people of Artsakh to live in their homeland.

Marutyan told reporters that he would only consider partnering with Samvel Karapetyan if his party commits to “the European path,” which he called their “biggest disagreement.”

Armenian National Congress (Levon Zurabyan)

The Armenian National Congress (ANC), founded by first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, is critical of Pashinyan’s foreign policy. The ANC’s candidate is Levon Zurabyan.

Following the Washington Accords, Ter-Petrosyan declined to evaluate TRIPP, saying it can only be judged once implemented. He said at the time that he was “somewhat puzzled” by Russia’s near-total silence and Iran’s mixed signals.

Levon Zurabyan, in a February interview, qualified TRIPP as a badly negotiated deal. He argues that while sovereignty is mentioned multiple times in the framework, it is clear from the details that “sovereignty has been taken away” from Armenia. In a more recent interview, Zurabyan doubled down on his interpretation of TRIPP as a “renunciation of sovereignty”. He insists that “exclusive rights” within the routes mean Armenia would effectively need American permission to build any intersecting infrastructure, such as a road to a remote village in Syunik or a railway to Iran. As an alternative, Zurabyan proposes the TRIPP+BRICS project with an international consortium involving Russia, China, and India alongside Western powers with the aim of balancing competing interests.

Zurabyan dismissed the current political discourse surrounding Armenia’s potential membership in either the European Union or a Union State with Russia and Belarus. He called the prospect of an EU accession a “deceptive fairy tale dream,” asserting that the EU has no actual plans for such expansion and is primarily interested in using Armenia to create problems for Russia. On the Union State, he suggested that Russia is currently in no position to pursue such a project. He concluded that both pro-Western and pro-Russian forces are engaged in a “battle over empty narratives” that distract the public from “real issues” affecting Armenia’s reality.

In an interview before the 2021 election, Ter-Petrosyan was critical of Western engagement in the region, suggesting that for the West, post-Soviet states like Armenia only have value in proportion to how much of a problem they can create for Russia. More recently, in September 2025, Ter-Petrosyan met with the Russian ambassador, stressing that “Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus is an absolute necessity and a reality confirmed by history.” He went on to describe Moscow as one of Armenia’s “true and reliable friends.”

Bright Armenia (Edmon Marukyan)

Former parliament member Edmon Marukyan’s Bright Armenia party was launched in 2016. At the time it called for a withdrawal from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and ultimately seek full membership in the European Union, but maintaining relations with Russia. Marukyan aligned with Pashinyan in 2017, but was in opposition between 2018 and 2022. He once again aligned with Pashinyan when he was appointed Ambassador-at-Large in March 2022, a position he held for two years. He resigned citing differences in “visions regarding a number of fundamental foreign policy issues in the recent months.” He has since become increasingly critical of Pashinyan.

In a recent podcast, Marukyan and number two on the party’s list, Karpis Pashoyan, explained their ideology as liberal conservatism. The two argued that they categorically oppose Yerevan “severing and dismantling its traditional ties” with Russia and Iran. Marukyan and Pashoyan claim that TRIPP has brought “risks and serious dangers” to Armenia, is being granted “in exchange for nothing,” and is going to become “a Turkish corridor.”

On EU membership, Marukyan states that Armenia has no chance of accession because the EU does not have the capacity for enlargement and Armenia has homework to do, namely the CEPA (Comprehensive And Enhanced Partnership Agreement), signed in 2017.

Regarding Russia, Pashoyan stated that while Russians are no angels and they do not advocate becoming Russia’s vassal or joining the Union State, Yerevan must maintain and develop relations with Moscow. “We cannot change geography,” he added, noting that Russian presence would remain in the region at some level of influence. Having problems with Russia will bring “catastrophic dangers”, he warned, pointing to the possibility of large-scale emigration and economic collapse that would stem from it.

Reformists (Vagharshak Harutyunyan)

The Reformists are led by Vahan Babayan, a former parliament member from Tsarukyan’s Prosperous Armenia, who is strongly pro-Russian. He has previously warned that without Russia, “Armenia will lose not only its security but also its national traditions, culture, and spiritual values” and that “if Armenia distances itself from Russia and entrusts its security to, for example, the West, it is unequivocal that Turkey will take that place, with all its consequences.” Babayan has also suggested that Armenia has “no alternative” to deepening its “allied relationship with Russia.”

The party’s candidate for Prime Minister is Vagharshak Harutyunyan, who has served as Armenia’s Defense Minister on two separate occasions, first in 1999–2000 and more recently in 2020–2021 under Pashinyan. He was then Armenia’s ambassador to Russia from 2022 to 2024. Harutyunyan is known for his close ties with Moscow.

In a March interview, Harutyunyan explained that given the current threats to Armenia’s security, he cannot remain on the sidelines. He argues that Armenia is currently in a state of war with both Azerbaijan and Turkey as they continue to blockade Armenia and there is no legally binding peace treaty, only a ceasefire. He suggests that security is based on military balance, not rhetoric.

Regarding partners, Harutyunyan acknowledges that relations with Russia are currently problematic due to both objective and subjective reasons. However, he stresses that Armenia still has legally binding treaties with Russia that must be maintained. While France provides equipment and training, he notes there is no institutionalized treaty. He suggests pursuing a legal document with India that goes beyond just buying weapons. He stressed Iran’s statements regarding the inviolability of the border.

He dismissed the possibilities of Armenia’s accession into either the European Union or the Union State of Russia and Belarus, but declined to comment whether he would work joining the Union State. He insists that any decision to join such entities would depend on specific negotiations, conditions, and the situation at that time. Regarding TRIPP, he expresses concern that Turkey and Azerbaijan may use financial means and private companies to infiltrate the region and eventually take control of the route.

Commenting on Putin’s remarks that he would like to see pro-Russian parties run in the election, Harutyunyan notes that the public declaration signals that Russia feels its interests are being threatened by Armenia’s shift toward the EU, suggesting that when Moscow starts making these demands publicly, it is a sign that private, closed-format discussions did not yield the results they wanted.  

Footes

[1] Tsarukyan has joint enterprises in both countries since 2010 and 2011. The Belarussian embassy in Armenia has been located next to Tsarukyan’s hilltop mansion just outside Yerevan since 2014. Tsarukyan was spotted in 2016 driving with Belarussian embassy license plates. In the same year, he gifted four rare white lions to the Lukashenko family.
[2] In February 2024, Tsarukyan attended a forum against neocolonialism organized by United Russia in Moscow.

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