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Home Opinion
Nov 16, 2026

European Integration and Strategic Autonomy: A Rebuttal to Armen Grigoryan

Sossi Tatikyan

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Armen Grigoryan’s recent article, “The Path to EU Membership and the Risk of Deepening Dependence on Russia,” raises important questions about Armenia’s foreign policy priorities, strategic autonomy and the geopolitical consequences of European integration. Coming from a former Secretary of the Security Council who played an important role in Armenia’s foreign and security policy-making, the article deserves serious consideration.

I share Grigoryan’s central objective of reducing Armenia’s excessive dependence on individual external actors and strengthening its capacity to make sovereign decisions. I also agree that full EU membership is not a realistic short- or medium-term prospect, although obtaining EU candidate status could be an achievable medium-term objective. Armenia must carefully assess the economic, political and security implications of its European aspirations. However, I disagree with his principal conclusion that pursuing EU membership deepens Armenia’s dependence on Russia or contradicts its multi-alignment strategy.

Russia’s Pressure and Armenia’s Choices

Grigoryan argues that Armenia’s attempts to move closer to the West have historically provoked Russian pressure and ultimately resulted in greater dependence on Moscow. He cites first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s policies, Armenia’s reversal of its decision to sign the EU Association Agreement in 2013, and recent developments following the adoption of the EU integration law.

The 1990s: A Misleading Historical Parallel

Grigoryan’s reference to the 1990s as evidence that Armenia’s rapprochement with the West resulted in greater dependence on Russia is particularly unconvincing. In fact, President Levon Ter-Petrosyan pursued a foreign policy based on the balance of power, seeking to maintain relations with Russia and Iran while developing cooperation with Western countries and institutions and other regional actors. This approach was fundamentally similar to the balanced foreign policy that Grigoryan now advocates as an alternative to Armenia’s European integration aspirations.

Yet this balance-of-power approach did not prevent Armenia’s growing dependence on Russia. On the contrary, the 1990s marked the beginning of a process through which Armenia increasingly bandwagoned with Russia, eventually developing an asymmetric security and economic relationship that substantially constrained its strategic autonomy. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a central driver of this process, reinforcing Armenia’s perceived security dependence on Russia in the context of the conflict with Azerbaijan and the closed border with Turkey. This trajectory was also shaped by regional security asymmetries, inherited Soviet infrastructure and the political choices of Armenia’s leadership—not by excessive rapprochement with the West.

The historical contradiction in Grigoryan’s argument is therefore significant. The very balance-of-power approach he proposes today was pursued under Ter-Petrosyan but ultimately coincided with the beginning of Armenia’s bandwagoning with Russia, producing precisely the excessive dependence that Grigoryan seeks to avoid. Rather than demonstrating the dangers of rapprochement with the West, the experience of the 1990s illustrates how a formally balanced foreign policy, without sufficient alternative partnerships and instruments of strategic autonomy, can evolve into asymmetric dependence on a dominant regional power.

The Lessons of 2013

The 2013 precedent does not necessarily support this argument. From the perspective of neoclassical realism, foreign-policy outcomes are shaped not only by structural constraints and external pressures but also by domestic political factors, leadership perceptions and strategic choices. Crucially, the Customs Union, which subsequently evolved into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), was being established and expanded precisely during this period. Russia was pursuing a broader geopolitical project of regional integration under its leadership and had a strategic interest in securing Armenia’s participation. Moscow would therefore have pressured Armenia to join the Customs Union regardless of whether Armenia had been negotiating an Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. Russian pressure was thus driven not simply by Armenia’s European integration aspirations, but by Moscow’s own geopolitical objectives.

By 2013, Armenia’s dependence on Russia had reached considerable proportions, both in terms of perceived security needs and actual economic dependence. These structural constraints significantly influenced President Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to yield to Russian coercion and abandon the Association Agreement and DCFTA, although they did not make that choice inevitable. The episode therefore illustrates the interaction between external constraints and domestic political choices, rather than establishing that European integration inevitably leads to greater dependence on Russia.

Armenia’s circumstances today are substantially different. Its security dependence on Russia has been significantly reduced through diversified defense and security partnerships with India, France, the EU and the United States, as well as cooperation with Iran. The EU is also helping Armenia reduce its economic dependence on Russia, although this remains a considerably more difficult and longer-term undertaking, given the depth of existing structural ties.

Coercion versus Dependence

I agree with Grigoryan that Russia has intensified its hybrid pressure on Armenia, including economic coercion, information operations and cognitive warfare, in response to Armenia’s foreign-policy diversification and growing European integration aspirations. These pressures pose serious challenges to Armenia’s sovereignty, strategic autonomy and resilience. However, intensified coercion should not be confused with an actual increase in dependence on Russia.

The causality suggested by Grigoryan is not convincing. The examples he cites, including increased support for pro-Russian political forces, the expansion of Russian cultural activities, and discussions about Russian involvement in infrastructure and nuclear energy projects, do not establish a causal relationship with the adoption of the EU integration law.

Similarly, Russia’s political, economic and cultural influence operations reflect its broader efforts to preserve leverage over Armenia, rather than necessarily being consequences of the EU integration law, which is not legally binding but rather symbolic. The timing of these developments does not establish causality, nor do they demonstrate that Armenia’s structural dependence on Russia has increased. 

Moreover, Grigoryan’s argument effectively implies that Armenia should accommodate Russia’s coercion and cognitive warfare by abandoning its European integration agenda to avoid further pressure. Yet allowing an external power to determine Armenia’s foreign-policy choices through coercion would itself represent a serious limitation on the country’s sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Such an approach risks reinforcing precisely the asymmetric dependence on Russia that Grigoryan seeks to overcome.

European Integration and Multi-Alignment

A key aspect of Grigoryan’s argument that merits further discussion is the relationship between European integration and foreign-policy diversification, which are not necessarily competing strategies.

Armenia has not pursued a clear-cut westward pivot but has adopted a strategy of multi-alignment or multi-engagement, developing differentiated partnerships with the EU, the United States, France, India, China, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Iran and other actors while maintaining relations with Russia. Multi-alignment does not require equidistance from geopolitical centers or identical relationships with all partners. Rather, it involves cultivating differentiated partnerships to strengthen a small state’s agency, strategic autonomy and resilience against external coercion.

This approach inevitably creates challenges, particularly when the strategic interests and red lines of Armenia’s partners conflict. So far, however, Armenia has demonstrated an ability to navigate these tensions while expanding its foreign-policy options. Its ability to maintain neutrality between the United States and Iran, as well as to develop relations with both the EU and Georgia despite their growing political disagreements, and establish strategic partnerships with both the United States and China, although these partnerships differ considerably in their scope and substance, illustrates the possibilities of multi-alignment even in a highly contested geopolitical environment.

The EU also appears to have drawn lessons from its experiences in Ukraine and Georgia, developing a more nuanced understanding of the geopolitical constraints facing countries in contested regions. In Armenia’s case, this includes recognition of its geopolitical liminality, structural vulnerabilities and the need to maintain diversified partnerships. The EU seems increasingly willing to accommodate Armenia’s cooperation with Iran, India and China, recognizing that these relationships serve important economic, security and connectivity interests and are not necessarily incompatible with closer European integration. This flexibility creates additional space for Armenia to pursue European integration within its broader multi-alignment strategy, rather than being forced into an exclusive geopolitical choice.

The Limits of EU Alignment

Nevertheless, obtaining EU candidate status would introduce additional constraints. Candidate countries are expected to progressively align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including its positions and restrictive measures concerning Russia and Iran. Although full alignment is not an automatic legal obligation upon receiving candidate status, it becomes an increasingly important political expectation during the accession process. This could complicate Armenia’s multi-alignment strategy, particularly given its economic dependence on Russia and strategic relationship with Iran.

The EU should therefore recognize Armenia’s specific geopolitical circumstances and refrain from expecting geopolitical exclusivity, particularly prematurely and in the absence of a credible membership perspective and corresponding security commitments. Armenia, for its part, must carefully manage the pace and scope of alignment, balancing its European integration aspirations with the preservation of essential partnerships and its strategic autonomy. European integration should expand Armenia’s strategic choices rather than prematurely restrict them.

Moreover, not all external dependencies are equivalent. Russia’s relationship with Armenia has involved substantial security asymmetries, economic leverage and restrictions on sovereign decision-making. EU integration involves legal obligations and institutional commitments, but also reciprocal rights, common rules, institutional participation and mechanisms for protecting member states’ interests. Equating these fundamentally different relationships overlooks their implications for sovereignty and national agency.

Regional Cooperation and Geopolitical Liminality

Grigoryan argues that European integration may undermine regionalization and complicate Armenia’s relations with Russia, Iran and Turkey. However, regional cooperation and European integration are not mutually exclusive.

Armenia’s geopolitical liminality, that is, its position between competing regional and international political, security and institutional orders, is an important structural driver of its foreign-policy choices. This condition creates both vulnerabilities, arising from competing geopolitical pressures and power asymmetries, and opportunities to cultivate differentiated partnerships. Multi-alignment represents Armenia’s strategic response to this condition, allowing it to exercise agency, diversify external support and strengthen its strategic autonomy without exclusive alignment with a single geopolitical bloc.

For Armenia as a small state, the fundamental question is whether its sovereignty, security and strategic autonomy would be better served by regionalism dominated by larger regional powers, without the EU and the United States as extra-regional strategic partners.

Armenia seeks regional cooperation and integration, but without balancing these processes through European integration and strategic partnerships with extra-regional actors, regionalism risks turning into a framework for the hegemony of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia over Armenia. One example is the 3+3 format which was proposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan as a platform for regional dialogue and cooperation for the three South Caucasus countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—with their three larger neighbors—Russia, Turkey and Iran. However, it excludes the EU and the United States and places Armenia in a framework shaped by larger regional powers. For Armenia, participation in such a format without meaningful counterweights could reinforce existing power asymmetries rather than enhance its agency and strategic autonomy. 

Iran, Turkey and Regional Constraints

Grigoryan’s interpretation of Iran’s position also requires greater differentiation. Iran’s principal concern is the expansion of U.S. military and security presence in the South Caucasus, rather than Armenia’s European integration as such. Tehran has not demonstrated comparable opposition to Armenia’s closer political, economic and institutional cooperation with the EU. Conflating these two issues risks overstating the geopolitical constraints on Armenia’s European aspirations.

Armenia has so far managed to develop strategic cooperation with the United States while maintaining constructive relations with Iran, demonstrating that its multi-alignment strategy can accommodate partnerships between actors with conflicting geopolitical interests.

Likewise, Turkey’s extensive economic and institutional relations with Europe complicate the assumption that Armenia’s European integration is incompatible with regional cooperation.

Energy Security and Economic Diversification

Grigoryan raises a valid concern about the implications of EU sanctions against Iran for Armenia’s energy security, particularly potential restrictions on Iranian gas imports and the existing gas-for-electricity arrangement. Armenia needs to take this risk seriously and accelerate energy diversification through the construction of a new nuclear power plant and the expansion of renewable energy generation. Reducing dependence on Russian gas while potentially facing restrictions on Iranian supplies requires careful planning, realistic timelines and substantial investment. Armenia should avoid commitments that jeopardize its energy security before credible alternatives are available.

Russia is offering to build Armenia’s new nuclear power plant at a critical juncture when a decision on this essential project can no longer be postponed. Moscow has a strategic interest in securing the contract and maintaining Armenia’s long-term dependence on Russian nuclear technology, fuel and maintenance services. It would therefore have exerted pressure to prevent Armenia from selecting another partner, regardless of its European integration aspirations. Armenia should instead choose a non-Russian supplier to reduce its energy dependence on Moscow. Selecting Russia would perpetuate this dependence for decades, providing Moscow with another powerful instrument of leverage to constrain Armenia’s strategic autonomy and obstruct its European integration aspirations.

The EU’s Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) offer an exceptional opportunity to support Armenia’s economic diversification and reduce its dependence on the Russian market, particularly as Moscow has already used import bans on numerous Armenian products as a coercive instrument. However, the envisaged two-year period is unlikely to be sufficient to substantially reduce Armenia’s structural economic dependence on Russia.

Achieving this requires sustained access to alternative markets, improved connectivity, investment, enhanced competitiveness and long-term EU support. Armenia should therefore build on the ATMs by pursuing more durable trade and economic integration arrangements, recognising that economic diversification will be considerably more difficult and time-consuming than diversifying its security partnerships.

These challenges call for carefully sequenced European integration and sustained economic transformation, not the abandonment of European integration as a strategic objective.

European Integration and Democracy

I particularly disagree with Grigoryan’s suggestion that pursuing EU membership could undermine Armenia’s democratic development. Democracy, the rule of law, human rights and institutional accountability are fundamental requirements of EU membership. The Copenhagen criteria establish democratic institutions, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights as essential conditions for accession. European integration should therefore serve as an instrument for strengthening democracy rather than weakening it.

Georgia provides an important example of how the EU responds to democratic backsliding in a country pursuing European integration. Despite granting Georgia candidate status in December 2023, the EU effectively halted its accession process in 2024 in response to the Georgian government’s actions undermining democratic institutions, fundamental freedoms and civil society. The EU also suspended financial assistance directly benefiting Georgian authorities, restricted high-level political engagement and increased support for civil society and independent media. In its 2025 enlargement assessment, the European Commission described Georgia as a candidate country in name only. These measures demonstrate that European integration is conditional on democratic standards and that geopolitical considerations do not automatically override democratic requirements.

Armenia has been a hybrid democracy and continues to face significant challenges in democratic governance, including the rule of law, institutional accountability, judicial independence and the quality of democratic institutions. European integration should not obscure these shortcomings or provide the government with immunity from criticism. On the contrary, an important dimension of Armenia’s closer relationship with the EU should be greater EU attention to the country’s democratic performance, accompanied by consistent expectations, monitoring and support for reforms aimed at improving the quality of Armenian democracy.

Individual political actors may seek to instrumentalize European integration for domestic political purposes, but this should not be confused with the objectives and requirements of European integration itself. Both Armenia and the EU should ensure that closer political and institutional relations contribute to democratic consolidation, stronger checks and balances, protection of fundamental freedoms and greater public accountability. The success of Armenia’s European integration should be measured not only by the depth of its relations with the EU, but also by tangible improvements in the quality of its democracy.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: Different Strategies

Grigoryan’s argument appears to lean toward a policy of equidistance rather than multi-engagement, resembling in some respects Azerbaijan’s approach. Yet the two countries occupy fundamentally different structural positions. Azerbaijan, benefiting from substantial hydrocarbon resources and the geopolitical leverage they provide, increasingly seeks to position itself as a middle power. Armenia, by contrast, is a small state with more limited material capabilities, operating in a geopolitically contested and liminal environment.

Its multi-alignment strategy therefore cannot simply replicate Azerbaijan’s approach. Rather than maintaining equal distance from competing powers, Armenia needs differentiated partnerships, including deeper institutional integration with selected partners, to compensate for structural vulnerabilities, diversify external support and strengthen its strategic autonomy.

The article also gives insufficient attention to Azerbaijan’s coercive policies and opposition to aspects of Western engagement, including the EU monitoring mission. Armenia’s European partnerships must be assessed in the context of these security challenges, not exclusively through the preferences of larger regional powers.

The Alternative to European Integration

Another important consideration is what the actual alternative to European integration would be for Armenia. In practice, it would mean remaining within, or further integrating into, Russia-led institutional frameworks and becoming increasingly constrained by geopolitical determinism. At present, no other international actor offers Armenia a comparable framework for institutional integration, economic modernization and political transformation.

Therefore, abandoning European integration would not necessarily produce a more balanced foreign policy. On the contrary, it could perpetuate Armenia’s asymmetric dependence on Russia and limit its strategic autonomy. The question is not simply whether European integration entails geopolitical risks, but whether the available alternatives would provide Armenia with greater sovereignty, security and freedom of strategic choice.

EU Membership: Ambitions and Realities

Grigoryan rightly distinguishes between practical cooperation with the EU and the political objective of membership. Armenia has already achieved substantial progress in relations with European partners without possessing a formal membership perspective.

I agree with Grigoryan that formally committing Armenia to EU membership in Armenia’s expected new constitution would be politically and strategically delicate. It would amount to making a premature commitment to a relationship in which the other party has not yet made a marriage proposal. The EU has neither offered Armenia a membership perspective nor indicated its readiness to consider accession. A formal commitment under these circumstances could expose Armenia to geopolitical costs without corresponding guarantees.

However, Armenia has not formally applied for EU membership, precisely because of the structural constraints and geopolitical risks, some of which Grigoryan himself identifies. The parliamentary law declaring the intention to launch the accession process is primarily a symbolic political declaration, rather than a legally binding commitment to accession. It neither constitutes a formal membership application nor obliges Armenia or the EU to proceed toward membership. Armenia’s leadership has thus far sought to reconcile its European aspirations with an awareness of the constraints and risks associated with formal accession commitments.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has made several statements about Armenia’s European aspirations, but one of his formulations seems particularly pragmatic: Armenia should strive to meet EU standards, and if the EU eventually accepts Armenia as a member, that would be an additional achievement; if not, Armenia would still benefit from having attained those standards. This approach treats European integration as not only geopolitical choice but also an instrument of domestic transformation, institutional modernization and democratic development, rather than making membership the sole objective.

Indeed, despite occasional ambitious and inconsistent political statements, Armenia’s leadership has so far pursued a largely pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, the government would benefit from placing greater emphasis on practical reforms, legislative approximation and institutional preparedness, and less on political declarations that may send inconsistent signals about its European integration objectives.

A long-term membership aspiration can provide strategic direction even when accession remains distant and uncertain. Ultimately, progress toward European standards would strengthen Armenia’s institutions, economy, democracy and strategic autonomy, regardless of whether or when EU membership becomes attainable.

Conclusion: Strengthening Strategic Autonomy

Grigoryan’s article provides a useful warning against geopolitical ambitions that are not supported by adequate economic resilience, institutional capacity and security arrangements. His emphasis on diversification and the reduction of excessive external dependencies is well founded.

However, his analysis places disproportionate emphasis on the potential costs of pursuing EU membership without adequately examining the costs of abandoning that objective. It also risks treating Russia’s coercive responses as constraints that should determine Armenia’s strategic choices, rather than challenges that Armenia must develop the capacity to manage.

Armenia should neither pursue EU membership as an end in itself nor abandon its European aspirations because of anticipated resistance from Russia or other regional actors.

The central question is not whether Armenia should choose between European integration and multi-alignment, but how it can pursue both in a mutually reinforcing manner, while avoiding premature commitments that are not matched by reciprocal European engagement.

European integration should be understood as one of the instruments of Armenia’s multi-alignment strategy, alongside diversified security partnerships, regional cooperation and economic resilience. Its ultimate value should be measured by its contribution to Armenia’s sovereignty, democratic development and strategic autonomy, and not solely by the prospect of eventual EU membership.

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