Armenia and Azerbaijan at UNGA81: Two Visions of Peace and Regional Order

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The statements delivered by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov at the 81st session of the UN General Assembly last week reveal both a significant transformation in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and contrasting approaches to positioning the two states within the evolving international order. Most notably, neither statement was primarily constructed as an exercise in diplomatic confrontation with the other. Both presented peace as a new reality and connectivity as an important component of the emerging bilateral relationship. Yet important differences remain over how peace was achieved, what still prevents its full institutionalization, how the legacy of the conflict is presented, and how the emerging regional connectivity architecture is conceptualized.

There is also an important difference in the level of representation. Armenia was represented by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, while Azerbaijan was represented by Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov rather than President Ilham Aliyev, who had addressed the General Assembly the previous year. 

The UN and Multilateralism: Two Different Uses of the General Assembly

The two statements differ notably in the weight and breadth they give to the UN and the broader multilateral agenda.

Pashinyan’s statement is predominantly centered on Armenia and the South Caucasus. He begins with the peace established between Armenia and Azerbaijan following the Washington Summit and devotes substantial attention to TRIPP, regional connectivity, relations with Armenia’s neighbors and other foreign policy priorities. The wider UN agenda occupies a more limited, although distinct, place in the speech.

Pashinyan nevertheless connects Armenia’s policies to several multilateral themes. He links Armenia’s “balanced and balancing” foreign policy to the logic of multipolarity, which he describes as one of the key principles of the United Nations, and presents Armenia’s contribution to stability and development in the South Caucasus as part of its contribution to international peace, stability and development. He concludes with Armenia’s hosting of the 17th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP17) in October 2026, giving Armenia a concrete role in the UN’s global environmental agenda.

Bayramov’s statement gives considerably greater space to the global and multilateral agenda and follows more closely the conventional architecture of a UN General Debate speech. He begins with global challenges, declining trust in multilateral mechanisms and the need for a “reinvigorated and reformed multilateral system.” He addresses international law, sovereign equality and UN reform, including Security Council reform and greater representation for developing countries and small states.

The multilateral agenda extends across much of his statement. Bayramov addresses the Sustainable Development Goals, development and humanitarian assistance, climate governance and Azerbaijan’s hosting of COP29, renewable energy and climate finance, urban development and the forthcoming World Urban Forum. 

A notable feature of Bayramov’s speech is the way he connects global and multilateral issues to Azerbaijan’s own record and activities. He links climate governance to COP29, sustainable development to Azerbaijan’s domestic achievements and development assistance, and urban governance to its hosting of the World Urban Forum. The broader multilateral agenda thus serves as a framework for presenting Azerbaijan’s experience and role in international affairs.

The difference is therefore primarily one of breadth and emphasis. Pashinyan engages selectively with the multilateral agenda, particularly around regional peace and stability, multipolarity and COP17, while concentrating predominantly on Armenia’s national and regional priorities. Bayramov gives greater prominence to a broader range of UN and global issues, using the multilateral framework to situate Azerbaijan’s national achievements and international role.

International Positioning: Foreign Policy Strategy and Global Role

The two statements also differ in how they present the countries’ positions within the international system.

Pashinyan provides an account of Armenia’s foreign policy strategy. He states that Armenia’s “balanced and balancing foreign policy” derives from the logic of multipolarity and presents the expansion of Armenia’s international partnerships as part of this approach. He specifically refers to recently concluded strategic partnerships with Georgia, France, China, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, the United States and the European Union. He also highlights the European Commission’s approval, on the day of his speech, of autonomous trade measures for Armenia, describing this as another manifestation of the “new quality” of Armenia-EU relations. He does not, however, explicitly refer to European integration in the speech.

Pashinyan also places particular emphasis on Armenia’s immediate neighborhood, describing the normalization and deepening of relations with neighboring states as a key element of his foreign policy vision. He points to the new dynamics with Azerbaijan, the normalization process with Türkiye and the exceptional importance of relations with Iran and Georgia. He describes relations with Russia as being in a “transformation phase” and highlights Armenia’s dynamically developing relations with the countries of Central Asia.

Taken together, these elements present diversification as more than an accumulation of bilateral relationships. They form part of what Pashinyan describes as a “multi-vector foreign policy”: developing strategic relations with multiple partners while maintaining ties across different geopolitical directions and deepening cooperation with Armenia’s immediate neighbors.

Bayramov presents Azerbaijan’s international positioning primarily through its role in regional and global networks. He portrays Azerbaijan as a natural-gas supplier to 16 countries and a contributor to European energy security; a transport and logistics hub between Europe and Asia through the Middle Corridor, the Baku International Sea Trade Port and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway; and a developing digital hub through the Digital Silk Way. He also invokes Azerbaijan’s previous chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement as part of its broader international role.

The contrast is therefore principally between an explicitly formulated foreign policy strategy and the projection of international role and capacity. Pashinyan presents Armenia as a small state seeking greater strategic autonomy and room to manoeuver by diversifying its partnerships, while Bayramov emphasizes Azerbaijan’s capacity to shape regional and international processes through its energy, transport and connectivity networks. This also reflects a difference in the international status each statement seeks to project: Armenia as a state navigating a multipolar environment and expanding its strategic options, and Azerbaijan as an aspiring regional middle power with the capacity to supply, connect and contribute beyond its regional neighborhood.

Domestic Self-Presentation: Democratic Resilience vs. State Capacity

The speeches also differ significantly in the domestic characteristics that the two governments choose to project internationally.

Pashinyan devotes considerable attention to Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections. He presents the result as an endorsement of the peace agenda and emphasizes the resilience of Armenian democratic institutions in the face of external information manipulation, disinformation, hybrid interference and what he describes as an attempt at state capture. While he does not name Russia in this part of the speech, these references concern Russian interference in Armenia’s electoral process. Domestic politics are therefore directly connected to foreign policy: the government presents the peace strategy as having received renewed democratic legitimacy.

Bayramov does not discuss Azerbaijan’s domestic political system or electoral legitimacy in comparable terms. Azerbaijan’s domestic self-presentation instead rests predominantly on state performance and capacity: economic development, public-service modernization, energy development, renewable-energy projects, digitalization and infrastructure.

The two states therefore emphasize different sources of international legitimacy. Armenia foregrounds democratic legitimacy and institutional resilience; Azerbaijan foregrounds developmental performance, administrative capacity and material achievement.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace: Growing Convergence, Persistent Narrative Asymmetries

The two statements demonstrate growing convergence in how Armenia and Azerbaijan present the current stage of the peace process, while retaining important differences over its interpretation.

Pashinyan states that peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been established, while Bayramov describes the situation as “de facto peace.” Both identify the August 2025 Washington Summit as a decisive turning point, emphasize sovereignty and territorial integrity as foundations for interstate relations, and discuss economic cooperation, trade, transit and infrastructure rather than military confrontation. This marks a substantial departure from the way Armenia and Azerbaijan traditionally presented their relationship at the General Assembly, with the UN podium no longer serving primarily to mobilize international support against the other side.

Differences emerge, however, over how peace was achieved. Pashinyan presents it as a joint Armenian-Azerbaijani achievement facilitated by United States engagement and President Trump’s personal role. Bayramov assigns Azerbaijan the principal agency, echoing earlier claims by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and his foreign policy aid Hikmet Hajiyev that Azerbaijan initiated the peace process and authored the peace agreement. This promotes a narrative of Azerbaijani ownership of the process, despite its longstanding obstruction and continuing role in delaying its finalization.

The unsigned peace agreement illustrates this difference further. Pashinyan describes the signature and ratification of the initialed agreement as the next major item on the joint Armenian-Azerbaijani agenda. Bayramov, by contrast, refers to a “remaining obstacle” that must be eliminated before the agreement can be finalized, implicitly referring to Azerbaijan’s constitutional precondition and preserving its position that the outstanding impediment lies on the Armenian side.

The two statements also differ in how they address unresolved humanitarian issues from the conflict. Pashinyan raises the issue of Armenian captives in Azerbaijan, noting that people in Armenia are awaiting their return. He refers to several thousand missing persons without framing the issue exclusively in terms of Armenian victims, notes an agreement to cooperate on clarifying their fate, and expresses readiness to deepen cooperation on demining as a common issue. Despite the major human losses and displacement suffered by the Armenian side during the conflict, Pashinyan does not construct his account around Armenian victimhood. He also does not raise the issue of territories of Armenia remaining under Azerbaijani control or the largely unresolved border delimitation process.

Bayramov emphasizes post-conflict reconstruction and the return of Azerbaijani displaced persons to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, referring to them as “liberated territories” and stating that more than 90,000 people now live, study and work there. His preceding reference to the eventual return of “hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis” contains ambiguity and has been interpreted in some Armenian circles as potentially extending beyond the displaced population returning to those territories.

In 2023–2024, Azerbaijani statements explicitly advanced claims concerning the “return” of Azerbaijanis who had left Armenia in the late 1980s and around the collapse of the Soviet Union. The current formulation therefore retains some ambiguity against the background of Azerbaijan’s established victimhood narrative and its expansionist elements within its “Western Azerbaijan” concept. Bayramov also focuses on missing Azerbaijanis, citing a figure of around 4,000 that remains contested, as well as Azerbaijani mine casualties and contamination of territories. 

An important element of Pashinyan’s speech is his argument that disputes concerning history and historical-cultural monuments, and the conflict rhetoric surrounding them, should not undermine the achievements of peace. In the context of the recent controversy over Gandzasar Monastery, this can also be understood as an implicit reference to Azerbaijan’s policy of Albanization of Armenian cultural heritage. Pashinyan’s broader argument is that such disputes should not be allowed to undermine the peace process.

Thus, the two statements differ in the weight they give to the past. Pashinyan focuses predominantly on the present and future of the peace process and argues against allowing conflict-related disputes to overshadow the peace achieved. Bayramov also emphasizes moving forward, but retains more elements of Azerbaijan’s established narrative of the conflict and its consequences, although in a considerably more restrained form than in previous years.

Connectivity: Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” and Azerbaijan as a Regional Hub

Connectivity is central to both statements and provides perhaps the clearest illustration of simultaneous convergence and competition.

Pashinyan places TRIPP at the center of Armenia’s post-peace economic strategy. He describes restoration of direct Armenia-Azerbaijan railway connections, reconstruction of the Meghri and Yeraskh sections and potential Armenian railway access through Azerbaijan toward Russia, Central Asia and China. He also connects TRIPP with the prospective reopening of the Armenia-Türkiye railway.

These connections are incorporated into a much larger geographic vision. Pashinyan argues that they could create a railway connection linking China and Central Asia through the South Caucasus and Türkiye with the European Union. He additionally presents restoration of the Armenia-Nakhchivan railway as contributing to Persian Gulf-Black Sea connectivity.

TRIPP is therefore embedded within Armenia’s broader “Crossroads of Peace” concept. Reciprocity is central to this presentation: Azerbaijan obtains connectivity with Nakhchivan through Armenia, while Armenia gains connectivity through Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Pashinyan explicitly stresses the Washington language of sovereignty, territorial integrity, jurisdiction and reciprocal benefits.

Bayramov presents Azerbaijan as an established regional hub through the Middle Corridor, the Baku International Sea Trade Port, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, energy infrastructure and digital networks. TRIPP thus expands existing routes and infrastructure. By contrast, Armenia presents new connections as a means of overcoming longstanding isolation and transforming its geopolitical position.

A terminological divergence remains. Pashinyan presents TRIPP as part of Crossroads of Peace and the Washington framework, while Bayramov places it within Azerbaijan’s “Zangazur corridor” terminology. The two governments have therefore converged substantially on practical arrangements while retaining different narratives about their regional significance.

From UNGA80 to UNGA81: Different Degrees of Change

Comparison with UNGA80 speeches by both countries shows different degrees of change in the two countries’ discourse. Pashinyan’s UNGA81 statement largely consolidates the direction established in 2025: peace moves from declaration toward implementation, particularly through the more concrete development of TRIPP, while Armenia’s network of strategic partnerships has expanded.  His criticism of Azerbaijan is also less direct than in 2025, when he explicitly challenged Aliyev’s “Zangezur corridor” and “capitulation” rhetoric. 

The change on the Azerbaijani side is more pronounced. Aliyev’s UNGA80 address was strongly structured around military victory and Azerbaijan’s account of the conflict, whereas Bayramov adopts a more reserved tone, gives substantially greater weight to multilateralism and Azerbaijan’s wider international role, and retains the established post-war narrative in a less confrontational form.

The comparison should be qualified by the different levels of representation—President Aliyev in 2025 and Foreign Minister Bayramov in 2026. It is also important to note that this year Pashinyan spoke first, while last year he reacted to Aliyev’s statement.  Nevertheless, the statements this year points to a narrowing rhetorical gap: continuity and consolidation on the Armenian side, and a more visible change of emphasis on the Azerbaijani side.

Conclusion: Convergence Without Narrative Reconciliation

The UNGA81 statements reflect both the transformation of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and different approaches to international positioning. Both governments now present peace as a current reality and economic interaction as an important part of its consolidation. Bayramov’s rhetoric on the conflict is more restrained than Aliyev’s at UNGA80. Yet important narrative differences remain: Armenia emphasizes joint achievement and reciprocity and seeks to reduce the role of conflict-related historical narratives, while Azerbaijan retains a stronger emphasis on its own agency, post-conflict narrative and elements of victimhood. 

The two statements thus reflect a new stage in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, characterized by substantial progress toward peaceful relations and practical cooperation alongside persistent differences in the narratives of the conflict and peace process.

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