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More than two months have passed since Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Washington under U.S. mediation, culminating in the signing of a declaration facilitated by President Donald Trump. The declaration, and the opportunities it presents, are important and welcome. However, beyond the congratulatory statements and endorsements from international actors, what truly matters are the developments on the ground.
Before the Washington declaration, I argued that the regime in Baku continued to hold the peace process hostage, and events since then have borne this out. As anticipated, no comprehensive peace agreement was signed, only an initialing by the foreign ministers of both countries.
Immediately after the D.C. meeting, the Azerbaijani side resumed using preconditions and hostile rhetoric. This article examines the indicators that typically reflect Baku’s stance on peace and considers whether any substantive progress toward a lasting settlement has been made.
It’s important to highlight the contrast between President Aliyev’s rhetoric when standing next to President Trump or other international partners and the language he uses upon returning to Azerbaijan. His policies are largely shaped by the rhetoric he uses for his domestic audience—rhetoric that is often backed by action. The entire Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process proves this: he spoke of peace but ultimately started a war.
These insights can help us form a more comprehensive and accurate picture behind the optimistic peace narratives and public declarations surrounding U.S. mediation.
State-Level Anti-Armenian Rhetoric in Azerbaijan: Does It Persist?
While seated beside President Trump, Ilham Aliyev—well known for his long-standing propaganda of animosity toward Armenia and the Armenian people, and with a well-documented record of hate speech[1]—stated on August 8: “I’m sure that Armenia and Azerbaijan will find the courage and responsibility to reconcile, and the people will also reconcile. We will turn the page of standoff, confrontation, and bloodshed, and provide a bright and safe future for our children…”
This was undoubtedly a significant statement. However, it bears little resemblance to the reality of Baku’s autocratic regime and its entrenched hostility toward Armenians.
Ironically—and regrettably—just days later, on August 21, Aliyev delivered his first domestic speech following the DC declaration. In it, he referred to Armenians by saying: “This society is sick, and I am saying this openly…”.
Over the course of an hour-long speech, Aliyev called Armenians “enemies” at least four times and portrayed them as “brutal.” He emphasized that “nothing will be forgotten,” stressed the need for further militarization, and glorified war, even praising the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.
This was not the only instance of inflammatory rhetoric following the Washington meeting. On October 7, at the 12th Summit of the Council of Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) held in Gabala, Aliyev stated: “We will never forget the occupation by Armenia. We will forever hold the memory of our martyrs close to our hearts. We avenged their blood on the battlefield. We expelled the occupiers from our ancestral lands, achieved a brilliant victory, and secured a just peace…”
Let’s be honest: this narrative does not align with the rhetoric and promises Aliyev made while sitting beside President Trump. Such a drastic shift in tone raises serious concerns about Azerbaijan’s sincerity in building lasting peace and fostering reconciliation. It also underscores the persistent presence of state-level hate rhetoric in Azerbaijan that directly undermines commitments made on international platforms.
Aliyev is not alone in his post-D.C. state-sponsored hate rhetoric, which continues his decade-long narrative that led to war and ethnic cleansing. The entire state apparatus, including members of parliament, is aligned with this tone. On September 15, Hikmet Babaoglu, a member of Azerbaijan’s ruling Yeni Azerbaijan party, stated in an interview: “I believe that every Azerbaijani should always consider the fact that every Armenian is a potential terrorist and should definitely take this factor into account—whether in their behavior toward Armenians or in their thoughts on security issues.”
He also added: “Our public opinion—today, tomorrow, and even 100 years from now—should have clear ideas about who Armenians are. We should not forget that if we show even a little trust in Armenians, that trust can later turn into a dagger in our back. Therefore, our citizens should always remain vigilant and once again think deeply about who Armenians are.”
The real danger here is that this is not a one-time occurrence, but a continuous state-sponsored hate narrative that remains the main obstacle to peace and reconciliation. However, this is not the only indication that meaningful change on the ground is absent and that Aliyev’s promises of peace are merely performative.
Ongoing Sham Trials of Armenian Hostages
During the Washington meeting, President Trump raised the issue of Armenian prisoners of war during a conversation with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in the White House. He stated: “Are you talking about the 23 Christians? I’m going to ask him [apparently referring to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev] to do it. I think they’ll do it for me. This is important, isn’t it?”
Despite this statement, no meaningful follow-up appears to have taken place. It remains unclear whether Trump made the request to Aliyev or not. What is clear, however, is the ongoing series of sham trials against the 23 Armenian detainees. These so-called “trials” serve no purpose other than to perpetuate hatred and animosity toward Armenians. The rhetoric in Azerbaijani media underscores this troubling trend. Consider these examples from after the August 8 meeting:
- Defendant’s testimony in preliminary investigation confirms Armenia’s continued looting in Khojaly from February 26 to March 8, 1992
- Madat Babayan reveals names of Armenian military personnel noted for extreme cruelty during Khojaly genocide
- Court examined documents related to numerous crimes committed against Azerbaijanis in 1988–1990
These are just a few examples of the headlines appearing on Azerbaijani state media. These narratives are clearly not about justice—they are part of a propaganda effort to demonize Armenians rather than address the actual issue: the prisoners’ unlawful detention.
Let’s be fair: if Azerbaijan had evidence of anti-Azerbaijani propaganda or actions by Armenian state leaders, it would not be pushing Armenia to withdraw all cases from international courts. Both countries have filed parallel cases at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), each alleging violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia accuses Azerbaijan of ethnic cleansing of Armenians, while Azerbaijan accuses Armenia of similar acts against Azerbaijanis––both cases are currently under ICJ review. Yet Azerbaijan has made the withdrawal of these cases a precondition for signing a peace treaty, even before the Court has issued any decisions. If they truly believed they held the truth, the most appropriate venue to prove it would be through international legal proceedings and a formal ruling. Instead, the authoritarian regime continues to operate behind closed doors, and this entire sham trial serves only to further fuel hostility against Armenians.
President Trump has a strong record of securing the release of hostages around the world. With a firm decision from the White House, all Armenian hostages could be released quickly. This would mark an important milestone in preventing hate-driven propaganda. It would also demonstrate President Trump’s influence in the South Caucasus, signaling that the United States is serious and effective in advancing its strategic objectives in the region.
This is where decisive action from President Trump could play a crucial role in building real peace.
“Western Azerbaijan”: Muted After August 8?
The narrative calling the Republic of Armenia “Western Azerbaijan” rests on the false claim that “Armenia was never present in this region before. Present-day Armenia is our land.” Ilham Aliyev has been one of its chief promoters, most notably reiterating this rhetoric on December 24, 2022.
Over the past few years, this revisionist narrative has become deeply embedded in Azerbaijan’s educational system, shaping how a new generation of Azerbaijanis is taught to perceive Armenia, not as a neighbor, but as a territory belonging to Azerbaijan’s “ancient land.”
Following the Washington, D.C. declaration and Aliyev’s meeting with the U.S. President, the so-called “Western Azerbaijan Community”—a group known for its expansionist rhetoric—sent a congratulatory letter to Aliyev. In it, they praised him: “Thanks to Your Excellency’s iron fist, resolute political will, high leadership skills, the unity of the Azerbaijani people, and the invincible power of our heroic Army, the glorious Victory you won in the Patriotic War has elevated Azerbaijan to a worthy position among the world’s states…”
The letter appeared on the official presidential website, but only in Azerbaijani. Although the site operates in three languages—Azerbaijani, English, and Russian—this letter was never translated. The omission appears intentional: while the message reinforces domestic narratives of triumph and aggression, its tone and content could have raised serious concerns abroad.
Days later, on August 14, certain Azerbaijani media outlets and pro-government ones active on X, began circulating false claims. They alleged that, following the August 8 accords, the Azerbaijani government had decided to dissolve the Western Azerbaijan Community and abandon related territorial claims.
This was untrue. Even Azerbaijani MP Aziz Alikberli, who leads a state-sponsored organization promoting expansionist narratives toward Armenia, publicly rejected it. On August 15, he stated: “This is complete fake news. Such claims come from Armenia. The Western Azerbaijan Community will issue a statement on the matter.”
Notably, Azeri Times—a pro-government Azerbaijani page on X with more than 20,000 followers and the main outlet spreading the false information—never shared or acknowledged Alikberli’s official denial.
This disinformation campaign was likely aimed primarily at an international audience. It attempted to create the illusion of a retreat from a dangerous and expansionist narrative—one that remains very much alive within Azerbaijan’s internal discourse.
Consider some concrete examples. The television channel “Western Azerbaijan” consistently spreads false information about Armenia while promoting an expansionist narrative. In one program, the hosts thank the Azerbaijani Ministry of Education for its work on the “Western Azerbaijan” concept, emphasizing the importance of raising a new generation with this ideology. In another segment, the Armenian city of Vedi in the Ararat region of Armenia is falsely presented as an “Azerbaijani” city. In yet another program, the channel covers the presentation of the first volume of the book “Western Azerbaijan Heritage” at the XI Baku International Book Fair— reinforcing the same revisionist message.
This is not the only media outlet engaged in such propaganda. Baku TV, a key government propaganda outlet, runs a series called “Western Azerbaijan Chronicle,” which features daily broadcasts presenting various territories of Armenia as part of Azerbaijan. These programs are part of a broader, state-driven effort to normalize territorial claims and spread expansionist ideology—directly contradicting the international commitments President Aliyev has made, including those in Washington. This is further evidence that Azerbaijan’s leadership is not preparing its population for peace or reconciliation. On the contrary, it is raising a new generation steeped in expansionist narratives directed against Armenia.
Why TRIPP Turned Into the “Zangezur Corridor” After Washington
The fourth point of the joint Washington declaration signed by all three leaders clearly states:
“The Republic of Armenia will work with the United States of America, and mutually determined third parties, to set forth a framework for the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’ (TRIPP) connectivity project in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.”
Standing beside Trump, Aliyev publicly affirmed this commitment, stating:
“TRIPP will unlock strategic economic opportunities that will create long-term benefits. It will promote infrastructure investment, enhance regional connectivity, and strengthen U.S. leadership as a champion of conflict resolution.”
Shortly after the meeting, however, Aliyev reverted to using terminology that implies territorial claims against the Republic of Armenia—rhetoric that is deeply problematic for the Armenian public. He resumed referring to the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” a term that has no connection to the terminology or agreements made under President Trump’s mediation.
For example, at the 12th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States on October 7, just one month after the DC meeting, Aliyev stated:
“In this context, one of the key outcomes of the Washington summit was the opening of the Zangezur Corridor. This corridor is significant as a new transport artery and serves as a second route within both the Middle Corridor and the North-South Corridor.”
Yet no such “corridor” was promised to Aliyev at the Washington summit.
On August 10, Azerbaijani state television aired a segment on its flagship Sunday program covering President Trump’s mediation and the peace process. The broadcast claimed:
“The point of unification of the three countries is the historical Zangezur corridor of Azerbaijan. The Zangezur corridor will be managed by the United States, meaning that the security of the road will be implemented by American companies…”.
This raises serious questions: Where is this narrative coming from? Why is Aliyev misrepresenting the agreed-upon terminology and avoiding the framework established under the TRIPP initiative? What is the political purpose behind this deviation?
First, it is worth mentioning that the term “Zangezur Corridor” was introduced into political discourse by the Azerbaijani leadership after the trilateral ceasefire statement signed on November 9, 2020, through Russian mediation.
Point 9 of that statement reads: “All economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the safety of transport communication between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with a view to organizing the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and cargo in both directions. Control over transport communication shall be exercised by the Border Guard Service bodies of the FSS of Russia.”
Despite the problematic logic embedded in this point—which arguably undermines Armenia’s sovereignty—the word “corridor” is never mentioned.
The November 9 trilateral statement has effectively lost its legitimacy and relevance following the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh on September 23, 2023.
Despite this, Aliyev continues to use the highly problematic term “Zangezur Corridor.” The term implies territorial claims against Armenia and is deeply intertwined with a fabricated historical narrative he has been promoting.
For instance, in an interview with Al Arabiya TV on August 27, Aliyev stated:
“In April 1920, the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied it. In November 1920, just several months after that, the Soviet Russian government decided to take Zangezur — what we call Western Zangezur — from Azerbaijan and give it to Armenia. That’s how Azerbaijan became divided into two: the mainland and Nakhchivan, with Western Zangezur in between.”
This narrative distorts historical reality and serves a calculated purpose: to legitimize expansionist ambitions under the pretense of restoring historical “justice.”
Some might dismiss this as mere semantics—“Let him call it whatever he wants.” But the terminology carries weight. The concept of Western Zangezur encapsulates a dangerous ideological framework that directly undermines prospects for peace. As such, it poses a crucial test for U.S. mediation efforts.
If President Aliyev refuses to respect even a term associated with a U.S.-brokered initiative bearing President Trump’s name, how can he be expected to uphold the principles behind it?
Presidents come and go, but agreements facilitated by the United States must endure. To ensure that they do, they must be reinforced through tangible safeguards—preventive mechanisms, accountability frameworks, and, when necessary, sanctions or other diplomatic instruments at Washington’s disposal.
Azerbaijan Bans Peace Discourse While Increasing Military Budget
Bahruz Samadov, a prominent peace advocate, was sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of treason and alleged ties with Armenians. He remains imprisoned with no hope of release––even after peace was supposedly achieved between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani independent researcher Vafa Nagiyeva notes:
“Against this backdrop, peace in Azerbaijan may be welcomed symbolically, but many questions are still left unanswered. For instance, when someone criticises corruption, or challenges election fraud, or tells a fraudulent MP ‘you have stolen votes’, will they still be branded as ‘pro-Armenian’ or a ‘traitor’? Or will the government invent a new narrative to delegitimise dissent?”
This is an often underestimated but crucial aspect of the peace process. If people in Azerbaijan are being jailed for speaking out in favor of peace and reconciliation, how can one believe the leadership’s intentions for lasting peace are sincere?
At the same time, Azerbaijan’s Finance Ministry has announced plans to increase the country’s defense and security budgets by $187 million, bringing the total to $5.1 billion in 2026. This announcement came following the DC meeting.
In contrast, during the same period, the Armenian government decided to cut defense spending for 2026. This is another indicator that the two sides interpret U.S. mediation efforts, including those led by the Trump administration, in very different ways.
If the Azerbaijani leadership continues to view Armenia and Armenians as “enemies” through its rhetoric and actions, and persists in promoting dangerous expansionist narratives, we should not naïvely assume that the increased military budget and further militarization are not directed against Armenia.
Conclusion
While peaceful voices such as Bahruz Samadov remain imprisoned, Azerbaijan’s defense spending continues to rise and Armenia has announced cuts to its own military budget. This growing imbalance raises concerns about the region’s stability and casts doubt on Baku’s sincerity in preparing for peace.
The United States must act not only as a mediator but also as a serious guarantor of the process it has initiated. President Trump’s credibility is now tied to ensuring follow-through on the agreements made under his leadership. A clear, public call for the release of Armenian hostages, along with a demand to end expansionist rhetoric, would send a strong signal. Moreover, the White House has significant diplomatic and economic tools—sanctions, economic and political pressure—that can encourage compliance and deter escalation.
Ultimately, it’s crucial not to let Aliyev sell his non-attack on Armenia at a high price. Ask the question: why should he even have the chance to attack Armenia? And if there are clear indicators of threat, wouldn’t it be wiser to eliminate them permanently? The U.S. president has a unique opportunity to do so.
Footnote:
[1] Transparency International has reported on state-sponsored campaigns of anti-Armenian rhetoric since 2020—particularly monitoring the years 2021, 2022, and 2023. These reveal that the Azerbaijani government systematically promotes the dehumanization and demonization of Armenians. This policy cultivates a national identity built on perceived superiority over and humiliation of Armenians. Such rhetoric of hatred serves two purposes: it inflames public sentiment and provides a manufactured moral justification for Azerbaijan’s continued military actions and violations of international humanitarian law.
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